Constructing Alternative Histories

Guest post by Bill Weber.

Robert Sobel’s For Want of a Nail: If Burgoyne Had Won at Saratoga was the first alternative history that I read.  As a history major in college, I was impressed with the breadth and depth of his imaginative story line of a failed American Revolution that begets a British Confederation of North America and a Jeffersonian United States of Mexico.

Perhaps inspired by this tale, I penned a short historical “what if” in a term paper for an international relations course.  I wondered how World War II might have ended if the US had launched its RANKIN and ECLIPSE contingency plans to drive deep into Germany and possibly seize Berlin if the Nazi regime suddenly collapsed, and how that would have reshaped postwar Europe.

As my interest in military history grew, I came to realize the importance of key factors in assessing and imagining battles and campaigns. Sun Tzu’s five major (national leadership, geography, weather, generalship, and terrain) and minor factors (quantity of troops, quality of troops, discipline, administration, and training) can be analyzed when assessing historical conflicts, and altered to produced alternative outcomes.  In "1814: How Washington Was Saved",  I substituted the more capable General Moses Porter for the inexperienced William Winder, and changed the battlefield to the more defensible Lowdnes Hill northeast of Bladensburg from the gradually rising ground southeast of the town.

In constructing this scenario, I also looked to the modern principles of war: objective, offense, mass,  economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity. In this re-imagining of the battle, Porter digs his force in on Lowdnes Hill, whereas in history, General William Winder allowed his subordinates to fight three separate engagements, allowing a smaller unified British force to prevail.

“Future analysis” techniques  can also be used to create imagined historical events. Neither Victor Nor Vanquished, America in the War of 1812, presents four alternative outcomes that alternately juxtapose a short and long war with American and British advantages in generalship.  The book also explored a worst case scenario for the US, and a counterfactual “what if the War of 1812 never occurred."

The bottom line is that it’s useful to have a method to your madness when writing alternate history. Using these techniques and insights—and those from other disciplines: economics, for example—will keep your imaginings internally consistent and attached to, if not grounded in, past events and trends. Readers undoubtedly appreciate carefully constructed scenarios and story lines that are not too fanciful and in being detached from the past. Moreover, such alternate histories can generate interest in and appreciation for the actual key events and trends in history: what happened and why, as well as their significance and lessons learned.

* * *

William Weber is the author of Neither Victor Nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Press, 2013) and The Long Century: The Congress of New Niagara, 1920.

Imagining The Long Century

Guest post by William Weber.

Rather than exploring the infinite permutations of the “century of total war” that began in 1914, the 100th anniversary of the First World War should prompt us to imagine how the “the long century” of relative peace and prosperity might  have continued.  Let me unpack that.

For French historian Raymond Aaron, the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War created a “Century of Total War” where the “immediate causes” and “remote origins” of conflicts have preoccupied historians –and provided alternative historians with a seemingly endless supply of counterfactuals.

Over the Top: Alternative Histories of the First World War is a good recent example of this literature. This anthology presents ten alternate scenarios in which the course of the war is changed forever. How would the war have changed had the Germans not attacked France but turned their main thrust against Russia; had the Greeks joined the allies at Gallipoli; or had the British severed the communications of the Ottoman Empire at Alexandretta? What if there was a more decisive outcome at Jutland; if the alternative plans for the Battle of the Somme in 1916 had been put into effect; or if the Americans intervened in 1915, rather 1917?
                                                                      
On the other hand, for British historian Eric Hobsbawm, the 125 years before the eruption of World War I in 1914 were dominated by the flowering liberal ideals of the French Revolution and the concurrent spread of material progress brought about by the industrial revolution. What events and actions might have carried that period forward into the 20th and 21st centuries?

The Long Century: The Congress of New Niagara, 1920 envisions this alternate history. It is the first installment of a trilogy with the yet-to-be-written second and third installments set, respectively, in 1970 and 2020. The story opens with an announcement of a second great power summit to convene in the City of New Niagara. There, Mayor Roosevelt, who accepted—rather than refused as he did in history—industrialist King Camp Gillette’s one million dollar offer to be the titular executive of the new futuristic metropolis, plans to host a conclave of the heads of state and government of the major powers. Roosevelt has the full support of his successor, President Hiram Johnson, who is running for reelection and present at the summit.

The book is presented as a compilation of the articles, notes, and letters of two reporters from the Philadelphia Public Ledger.  My inspiration for this approach was Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia: The Notebooks and Reports of William Weston. David Woodhurst who covers Buffalo, New Niagara, and Niagara Falls, focuses on tensions between Roosevelt and the city manager, who actually runs the city. Gregory Sheridan, posted to London, provides the perspectives of the European delegations that sail for America. This approach allows readers to “connect the dots” for themselves as the conclave convenes, deliberates, and adjourns, and as the subplots unfold.      

* * *

William Weber is the author of Neither Victor Nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Press, 2013) and The Long Century: The Congress of New Niagara, 1920.

1914: Christmas Truce or Christmas Peace

Guest post by William Weber.

The centennial anniversary of World War I has drawn attention to the Christmas Truce of 1914, a series of spontaneous cease-fires along the Western Front where soldiers on opposing sides sang songs and played football. These brief expressions of camaraderie and goodwill stood in marked contrast to the carnage of the preceding months and the next four years.  The British firm Sainsbury’s in cooperation with the Royal British Legion has recreated this famous moment in a short video.

Scholars are revisiting why the “Great War” occurred and lasted much longer than expected. For example, Stephen Walt’s “It’s Not the Guns of August – It’s the Trenches of October” examines the “July Crisis” that sparked the war, and lists strategic factors that prolonged the fighting: neither the Triple Alliance, nor the Triple Entente could deliver a decisive blow; both sides were industrial powers with large populations and diverse economies; their war aims increased over time; their politicians defended “sunk costs” by promising to deliver success as the fighting continued; censorship and propaganda convinced citizens that victory was just around the corner; and military establishments proved difficult for civilian governments to control, proclaiming there was “no substitute for victory.”

British historian B.H. Lidell Hart’s 1932 book The British Way in Warfare also investigated why the war lasted longer than expected from an strategic-operational vantage point that Americans marking the sesquicentennial of the American Civil War will find insightful.  His third chapter, “The Sign Post That Was Missed,” notes that European military planners built their doctrines on the Prussian campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. They favored “the prompt application of superior force in a direct manner with little trace of guile.” In particular, the French assessed that moral superiority (elan) of their troops would overcome any inferiority in numbers. Hart judged that they were saved from their folly by German General von Moltke’s tinkering with and clumsy execution of the Schlieffen Plan.  He made the German left flank too strong for the French to drive back and the right flank too weak to encircle Paris in a timely fashion.  The result was the First Battle of the Marne and a long war.

Hart asked “What might have been the effect, and the difference, if military thought in pre-1914 Europe had been nourished on a comprehensive study of 1861-65 instead of on 1866-71? He argued that the Union operations in the West, far from the cockpit of the war in the mid-Atlantic, were more decisive in securing the North’s victory. Farragut’s capture of New Orleans and Grant’s victory at Vicksburg split the Confederacy in half. The Union’s strategic sequel, the opening of the Chattanooga gateway to Georgia, the granary of the South, made defeat “hardly avoidable” and led to Sherman’s capture of Atlanta. Hart then concluded that the collapse of the Confederate army was “due to the emptiness of its stomach reacting on its morale and (to) bad news from home.”

He speculated that had European military planners studied the American Civil War, they might have realized that “a quick decision in such a conflict of nations was but a bare possibility, which could only be fulfilled by adopting a truly subtle strategy to lure the opponent into a trap . . . On  a higher plane an adequate study of the American Civil War would also have warned the General Staffs of Europe to expect and prepare for a long war, even though they hoped for a short war.” If so, the Christmas Truce might have been a Christmas Peace.

* * *

William Weber is the author of Neither Victor Nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Press, 2013).

Check Out William Weber's Strategic Surprise The British Capture of Washington, DC, 1814

Guest post by William Weber.

This month, 24 August to be exact, marks the 200th anniversary of the British capture of Washington, DC.

Strategic Surprise: The British Capture of Washington, DC, 1814 examines the British invasion and the American response. It highlights how British deception shaped American perceptions leading to the capture of the Nation's capital, noting how events could have unfolded differently. It also presents a fictitious warning memorandum written for President Madison, laying out alternative British objectives and capabilities. Having received this information, what would you have done?  

It compliments previous posts to this blog "Rethinking the War of 1812" and "1814: How Washington Was Saved". A more extended treatment of the this issue appears in Neither Victor Nor Vanquished, "Chapter Six: The Battle of Bladensburg: Could Washington Have Been Saved."

Editor's Note: Weber is a little too modest enough to admit his article was also picked up by io9 where it received over 33.000 views.

Britain’s Pyrrhic Victory: New Orleans, 1814 (Part 2)

Guest post by William Weber. Read part 1 first!

“Go on,” Pakenham encouraged Thornton. The general was eager to hear the details of the attack on the Crescent City.

“The magazines exploded sending a pillar of fire and stone high into the heavens. I can only conclude that Jackson ordered them destroyed to prevent the powder, shot and arms from falling into our hands. As it was near dusk, the light was at first blinding. By the time we had recovered our senses, the fiery debris began to land all around. Fires broke out on the wharves. The cathedral’s wooden roof began to smolder, and the dry timbers beneath soon collapsed setting fire to the interior. The now abandoned government house similarly burned.”

“Meanwhile, our battalion to the north led by Major Jenkins ran into a local force of Creoles marching in from nearby St. John’s. Jenkins reported afterward that these Americans gave a good account of themselves. They retreated only when they, too, saw the explosion and concluded we had already taken the heart of the city. Consequently, Jenkins was able to sweep around the city’s perimeter, leaving small detachments at each of the tumbled down strong points.”

“By the time his troops linked up with mine at the city center, more buildings had caught fire. I believe that untended hearths in quickly abandoned homes fueled the growing conflagration. In my time on the Continent, I have also seen looters in such situations feed the flames to cover their deeds and their retreat.”

“And what about Jackson’s purported threat to burn down the city, rather than see it captured?” Pakenham asked.

“I can neither rule it out or in,” Thornton replied.

“What do your prisoners say?” the general asked.

“We did not have time to take many after the magazines exploded. Frankly, we were preoccupied with reforming our units and deciding whether to stay hold our position or retreat.”

“Obviously, you chose the latter. Why?”

Thornton instinctively became defensive and more formal. “Sir, first, I knew that we were outnumbered. We had not encountered any of the thousands of troops we had been told to expect by the troops we captured at Fish Island. Second, no longer having the element of surprise, I was increasingly concerned about concentrating my forces in a defensible position. At the time, the burning city looked less like that place with every passing minute. And third, night was quickly upon us. We would have trouble both gathering our troops and seeing the approach of  the Americans from any quarter.”

“So, you took the wisest course of action, and retreated.”

“Yes, sir. I ordered the regiment to pull back to this canal. As you have seen, it is quite defensible and the Americans have only harassed us with bombardment. I have seen no signs of a direct assault.”

“Colonel, I’m quite satisfied that you chose the best course of action. You are to be commended.”

“Thank-you, sir.”

“You are quite welcome. But now we have to face two dilemmas.”

Thornton was experienced and prudent enough not to guess what those might be and paused to lift his cup once again.

“The first, is whether to reinforce this attack and recapture the city, or to retreat,” said Pakenham.

“Yes, sir.”

“I’m asking for your military opinion, Colonel.”

“General, I have always favored offensive action. The Americans may not have attacked because Jackson now has to reassert his authority with his forces and the civilian population. The city burned just as his accusers said it would. His army was always a composite force, and the local militia may just want him to head back upriver to Tennessee or wherever. Perhaps we can exploit divisions in his camp. One more attack and we could repeat our success in Washington.”

“Yes, a possibility. In fact, our major objective is to control the Mississippi and compel Madison to come to terms, if not surrender. But recall, that we never intended to hold Washington. Like the American capital, New Orleans is close to the sea, but surrounded by fortified points that we would have to capture or reduce to truly control the city. The fort down river, for example, blocks a direct route to the sea. It would take time to reduce it. Moreover, unlike Washington, as we saw a provincial little village, New Orleans is a small city that we’d have to defend and police.”

“True, sir.”

“Alternatively, this game may not be worth the candle. We could simply declare victory and pull back to the fleet.”

“And go where, sir.”

“Back to Fort Bowyer to the east. We didn't press out attack there in September because of our initial losses and our plans to focus on the main objective of our campaign, New Orleans.”

“Yes, we might avenge ourselves for the losses. The fort could be another bargaining chip for us at the peace talks in Ghent. Assuming, that is, that they haven’t broken down. Bower might help us defend hold Florida, too. Only a matter of time before the Americans try to take it from the Spanish.”

“But what is the other dilemma, sir?”

“The likelihood certain uproar among our allies on the Continent about us having burned another American city,” replied Pakenham.

“Who listens to those voices, sir?”

“Wellington one, and the Prime Minister for another. In October, Wellington informed Castlereagh that the attack on Washington had made things difficult for British diplomats negotiating a European peace agreement in Vienna. Moreover, French press articles that condemned the attack have been echoed in British newspapers. News of the burning of New Orleans will only make things more difficult for His Majesty’s government at home and abroad.”

“We cannot undo what has happened,” Thornton said.

“True, but we can distance ourselves from it. Geographically speaking.”

“In that case, I request permission to march back to Bienvenu and the Villere Plantation, and from there to Pea Island and the fleet.”

“Permission granted, Colonel Thornton.”

Fort Bowyer surrendered to the British on 12 February 1815. The Treaty of Ghent, signed on Christmas Eve 1814, arrived in the United States and was ratified by the US Congress on 16 February. Pakenham’s forces, having suffered only minor casualties in the Gulf campaign, played a major role in crushing Napoleon’s army at Waterloo on 18 June 1815.

A board of inquiry presided over by Major General Jacob Brown investigated the sack of New Orleans. It heard testimony regarding the British attack and the origin of the conflagration that consumed much of the city. Like the congressional investigation that found Brigadier William Winder blameless for the capture of Washington, this board exonerated Andrew Jackson. Jackson, however, resigned his commission and retired to private life, never to serve in uniform or in any public capacity, again. He retired with his wife, Rachel, and their children to his plantation, The Hermitage, outside on Nashville, Tennessee.

* * *

William Weber is the author of Neither Victor Nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Press, 2013).

Britain’s Pyrrhic Victory: New Orleans, 1814 (Part 1)

Guest post by William Weber.

Early this year 1814: How Washington Was Saved, imagined how the Nation’s capitol was successfully defended from the British attack, leading to an early termination of the War of 1812. As they say, “Turn about is fair play.” This alternate history of Andrew Jackson’s defense of New Orleans is written from the perspective of the British victors. In history, Major General John Keane paused nine miles outside the city waiting for the main body of troops to arrive, despite the urgings of Colonel William Thornton to immediately attack the city while they still had the element of surprise. According to Alexander Walker’s 1856 Jackson and New Orleans, “. . . there can be no doubt in the mind of any person, who views the condition of affairs in the city at this juncture, that it would have required a miraculous intervention to have saved it from destruction if Colonel Thornton’s council had prevailed.”

* * *

Colonel William Thornton, commanding the 85th Foot Regiment, slowly rose from his cot. He had gotten only a few hours of sleep after two grueling days and nights. His aide, who had just awakened him, put a hot pot of tea and a light breakfast on the table after apologizing for waking him with urgent news.

“Tell the lieutenant that I will see him, now,” Thornton said.

“Yes, sir,” his aide replied. Thornton slipped on his jacket and poured himself a cup of tea. He had barely brought it to his lips when the young officer entered.

“Lieutenant Fitzgerald, sir,” he said with a smart salute.

“At ease, Lieutenant. You have news?”

“Yes, sir. General Pakenham arrived at the Villere plantation one hour ago with some 2,000 men. He instructed me to inform you to expect him by mid-morning, sir.”

“Very well. Please give him my regards and that I am delighted at his arrival. I will brief him on our situation when he arrives.”

“Yes, sir.”

“Lieutenant, get some thing to eat for yourself and your escort before you depart.”

“Yes, sir. Thank-you, sir,” he said, saluting before exiting the tent.

“And, Merry Christmas.”

“And to you, sir.”

Thornton emptied his cup, poured himself another and snatched a biscuit from the plate. He pushed his way through the flap in the tent into the freezing morning air. If he didn’t know any better, Thornton might have thought that the sun was rising in the west. Orange-tinted light colored the great pillars of smoke rising in the distance as it had the day before.

Four months earlier, he had seen from a similar distance the fainter glow from the fires that consumed the American house of parliament, the President’s mansion, and the Washington navy yard. At that time, he was a badly injured, prisoner-of-war in the small town of Bladensburg, Maryland. It was ironic that in the months since being exchanged, he was watching another American city burn. No, he corrected himself, this time it was a city. Washington was little more than a village.

Quickly finishing breakfast, Thornton shaved, changed into the clean uniform set out by his orderly and pulled on a clean pair of polished boots. They would not stay clean for very long. With his aide and personal guard in tow, he set out on his routine morning inspection. Half of his troops were still sleeping in their positions along the Rodriquez Canal. The other half were standing watch and eating a cold breakfast.

He doubted that they’d see any action today. Yesterday, the Americans had scouted and probed his position. They had also sent a gunboat to fire down the left flank of his line, but he had anticipated this attack and used captured cannon, powder, and shot to drive the steamboat off after less than half an hour. Now, his troops deserved a quiet, restful Christmas. They had earned it.

At mid-morning Thornton’s aide interrupted him while he was writing a letter to wife, wishing her a holy Christmas and a happy New Year. He had already written her such a letter a month earlier that she might have received by now. But, he wanted her to know that he was thinking about her, today.

“Sir, the vanguard of General Pakenham’s force is approaching,” his aide interrupted.

“Did you see the general?” Thornton asked.

“Yes, sir.”

“Good, lad. I’ll be there in a moment.”

“Yes, sir.”

Thornton greeted Pakenham formally. Major General Sir Edward Michael Pakenham, who joined the British army in 1794, was the brother-in-law of the Duke of Wellington. Thornton had met Pakenham when they both served under Wellington on the Iberian Peninsula. They were well aware of each other’s capabilities and accomplishments. Both had been born in Ireland, the general in 1778, and the colonel in 1779. Pakenham had accepted command of the invasion forces for Admiral Alexander Cochrane’s Gulf coast campaign even though he was questioned the viability of the plan and the reporting it was based on. Thornton set his rank aside and asked the first question.

“Your Excellency, do you have word of General Keane’s condition?”

“Let us dispense with the titles, John. He is back on Pea Island, and recovering.”

After the British Navy won the battle of Lake Borgone on 14 December, Pakenham laid plans to send Major General John Keane and Thornton’s regiment from Pea Island to Bayou Bienvenu, stopping en route to seize Fish Island. From Bayou Bienvenu they would row to Bayou Mazant, and up the Villere Canal to the left bank of the Mississippi before marching nine miles to New Orleans.

“Thank-you, sir. I am relieved,” said the Pakenham.

“I must say that you decision to press on with the attack and leave him behind was appropriate under the circumstances.”

“When the general fell ill en route from Pea Island, I thought it prudent to leave him on Fish Island with an armed guard until we could send boats back to return them to the fleet. Unfortunately, at that point he was quite delirious and unable to make such a decision, himself.”

“It was a necessary risk,” Pakenham reassured him, “and Keane approved of your decision when he regained his senses.”

“I appreciate his support and understanding.”

“Yes, quite,” Pakenham nodded. “Now, if I could trouble you some something warm to drink, we can then get down to discussing our current situation.”  He paused looking to the west as the plumes of smoke. “And, how we came to this juncture,” he added.

“Yes, sir. Gentlemen, please this way,” Thornton replied.

When they were settled in his tent and sufficiently warmed, Pakenham began his inquiry.

“I must ask why you left the Villere plantation on Bienvenu to attack New Orleans without waiting for all of our forces to arrive.” The plantation was home to retired Major General Jacques Phillipe Villere, commander of the Louisiana militia, and his son, Major Gabrielle Villere. The main house was a single story affair with wide galleries at the front and rear.

“General, it was my intention to follow orders and do so, but Major Villere’s attempted escape might have robbed us of the element of surprise.”

“Yes, I saw his freshly dug grave.”

“I can assure you, sir, that the sentries fired on my orders and had they not done so, the major most certainly would have warned General Jackson.”

“I see,” Pakenham nodded, clearly agreeing.

“So, I ordered a quick march on the city.”

“Go, on.”

“I cannot emphasize enough how fortunate we were that none of the local inhabitants, the Creoles, alerted the Americans of our presence. They were quite aware of our location after the guards fired numerous shots at Maj. Villere. Based on this edict issued by Jackson’s aid-de-camp, I now have a better understanding of how his unpopularity with the locals presented us with an opportunity.”

Thornton reached into the portfolio of papers on his table and handed a printed flyer to the General.

“Apparently, rumors that Jackson planned to burn the city preceded our arrival. His aide-de-camp issue this document, warning that we would sack the city, referencing the unfortunate circumstances that occurred in Hampton, Viriginia last year.

“Yes, a despicable event,” Pakenham noted. In June 1813, after the British captured the town, their Independent Companies of Foreigners—former French soldiers who now fought for the Crown—engaged in a spree of vandalism, rape, and murder.

“As you can read, Jackson also threatened any collaboration with death, and called upon the city to identify those persons who spread what he called an ‘unfounded report’ that he planned to burn the city rather than see it fall into our hands. He ended this missive with a particularly threatening message. I quote, ‘should the general be disappointed in this expectation, he will separate our enemies from our friends—those who are not for us are against us, and will be dealt with accordingly.’"

“Go on,” Pakenham said.

“Assuming that might have support among the locals, I immediately quick marched the regiment that afternoon to New Orleans. We met with no opposition.

“None?” the general asked.

“None. Apparently, the American forces had yet to converge to defend the city. We had been told by the militia that we captured on Fish Island that some 12 to 15 thousand defended it.”

“And, so you marched against it with a tenth as many?” Pakenham asked with a wry smile.

“Yes, sir. Given how we had routed the militia at Bladensburg, and entered Washington unopposed, I was confident of our chances. We later learned that Jackson had far fewer men under arms, all scattered throughout the area.”

Pakenham paused to lift his cup, which Thornton refilled, taking a sip from his own.

“We reached the gates of the city after two hours, late in the afternoon. As you can see on this map, battlements and a series of forts protect New Orleans. They were in poor repair and lightly manned. We crossed the bridge and seized Fort St. Charles meeting only limited resistance. Most of the defenders fled when they saw our approach. I sent one battalion northwest along the inner wall to take Fort St. John and then southwest to the gate guarded by Fort St. Ferdinand. I led the main body into the heart of the city to capture the barracks that fell immediately, and magazines and the government building at the center of the waterfront. And then, everything went wrong.”

Read part 2 tomorrow!

* * *

William Weber is the author of Neither Victor Nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Press, 2013).

1814: How Washington Was Saved (Part 2) by William Weber

Wait! Don't forget to check out Part 1.

When the British resumed their advance the next morning, they unexpectedly encountered no harassment from the American militia. Cockburn attempted to convince Ross that the firm hand they had shown over the last few days had finally convinced their pesky adversaries to cease and desist. Ross expressed doubts that they could be so lucky.

The general’s hunch proved to be correct. As they approached Bladensburg in the afternoon, Thornton reported a large American force that he estimated to include several thousand troops, mostly militia, entrenched on Lowdnes Hill off to the right of the road that followed the northern bank of the eastern branch of the Potomac into Bladensburg. Ross ordered his troops to deploy with the Light Brigade anchored on the road, the Second Brigade in the center directly facing the hill, and the Third Brigade covering the right flank. He then called a conference of his brigade commanders and Cockburn.

Cockburn and Thornton argued for an immediate frontal attack on the hill arguing that the British veterans would have an easy time putting the American militia to flight. “They have no battle experience,” the admiral argued. “They’ve given us enough trouble over the last few days,” Brooke countered by noting, “We also do not know what forces, if any, are on the other side of that hill."  Patterson suggested sending the few scouts they had mounted on horses taken from farms to ride around the hill to answer that question. Ross agreed, adding that he wanted to attack quickly and take Bladensburg by nightfall.

When his scouts returned without seeing any additional American forces, Ross ordered Thornton to advance down the road as quickly as possible and into Bladensburg to secure the bridge over the river. His brigade commanders agreed this might panic the troops on the high ground because it would cut off their escape route to Washington. The Second and Third Brigades would proceed at a more measured pace to the trenches on the hill, some of which contained cannons. Ross ordered his artillerymen equipped with inaccurate Congreve rockets to fire on the hill and into the town to confuse and frighten the Americans. “To victory, gentlemen,” he added.

The American commanders watched the British formation transformed from marching columns to battle lines. “As I expected,” Porter observed. “They are going to attack in strength, counting on their elan and experience to overwhelm our defenses.”  He had assembled some 6,000 troops. Over 3,000 Maryland militia under General Stansbury occupied the Hill’s fortifications supported by some 500 federal troops and sailors under Barney. Another 1,500 District militia commanded by Van Ness held the town. Porter had positioned Minor’s Virginia regiment on the National Road out of Bladensburg to Washington, and stationed 300 amalgamated cavalrymen in reserve on the back side of the hill.

“Do you expect them to hold?” Secretary Armstrong asked. “Yes, we’ll do even better than we did at Bunker Hill,” Porter replied. “They are going to pay a very high price. I know you think regulars will always trump militia, Mr. Secretary, but I plan to prove you wrong.”  “Godspeed,” Armstrong replied as he mounted his horse and joined his escort that headed for the bridge and Washington.

“Gentlemen,” Porter said to his assembled commanders, “Colonel Laval’s cavalry will emerge from the woods on left flank once the British have closed half the distance to the top of the Hill. Remember, that is the signal to return fire.”

He paused a moment, glanced at each of them. “My favorite ancient Greek, Archimedes of Syracuse said, ‘Give me a fulcrum and I shall move the world.’ This hill is our fulcrum, our army is our lever, and today, we will move the world. God bless us, and damn them to hell.”

The battle began as Porter had imagined with the British troops slowly moving in line toward him. He and his entire command were surprised by the Congreve rockets that screamed at them before exploding in the air and on the ground. However, their entrenchments gave the militia physical protection and emotional security, and the British artillerymen lacked enough rounds to sustain their fire for very long.

Porter was more alarmed by the rapid advance of the British units on his right toward the town that threatened to cut him off from the roads to Washington. Fortunately, the enemy troops soon expended their energy. Weakened by the day’s march and the hot humid weather, they faltered when they came under fire from the DC militia inside the brick buildings and makeshift barricades in the street. Van Ness’s insistence on mobilizing his forces before the British arrived had given them the time to train and prepare their defenses. Although it took repeated volleys that consumed most of their ammunition, the effect on the Light Brigade was devastating. They staggered and then retreated in good order, albeit without their regimental commander, Thornton, who fell at the high water mark of their advance among a cluster of his infantry, brought down by cannon and musket fire.

Moments later, Colonel Laval’s composite federal-state cavalry unit charged from the woods on the American left flank. Lieutenant Colonel Brooke halted the Third Brigade and ordered his men to form squares to ward off the attack. As they did so, the American artillery fired on the compact formations just after the American cavalry broke off their charge.

Ross watched his flanks crumble just as the Second Brigade came within musket range of the American center. Barney’s naval guns ripped huge holes in the scarlet lines ascending the hill. Colonel Patterson and most of his aides died in the first few minutes, as did large numbers of British infantry. Yet, the well-trained veterans of the Napoleonic Wars marched steadily forward until their ranks thinned to the point where Commodore Barney ordered, “Board’em!” Maryland militia joined his sailors and marines in charging down the hill. The Second Brigade held for a few minutes and then broke.

Suddenly, defeat for the British turned into disaster. Ross and Cockburn rushed forward on horseback to rally Patterson’s brigade. The admiral fell first when a canon ball sliced through a brace of soldiers that he was alternatively berating and exhorting to hold their ground. While a cheer immediately erupted from the American ranks, an eerie silence fell among the British soldiers who gazed upon the dead naval officer pinned underneath his dead horse. Ross then took two rounds, one in his arm and another in his thigh, and fell from his charger. A platoon quickly created a litter with their muskets and jackets to carry him to the rear.

Brooke assumed command of the British forces and converted a near rout into an orderly retreat to Upper Marlboro where 500 British sailors and marines had remained with the British flotilla after Barney’s gunboats were scuttled. Ross once again found himself at Beanes’s house, now as a patient rather than an as unwanted guest. Beanes advised him that until the bullets could be extracted and damaged blood vessels cauterized, any further movement would probably result in his death. His stretcher-bearers volunteered to stay with their commanding officer as Brooke sent a report to Cochrane and continued the orderly march to Benedict.

At Bladensburg, Porter was determined to hold his position and not pursue the retreating British. He ordered all units to report their casualties, repair their positions, eat supper, and deploy sentries and pickets. He then wrote a short note to the President:

Mr. President,

I have the high honor and privilege to report that the officers and men under my command have soundly defeated a British attack undoubtedly designed to capture the City of Washington. 

I intend to hold this place until such time as the enemy has boarded his ships and withdrawn from the Patuxent River.

Respectfully, 
Brigadier General Moses Porter, 
Commanding Officer, Tenth Military District                  
                               
In the days that followed, Cochrane withdrew his fleet and invasion forces from the Chesapeake and set sail for Jamaica. He sent identical reports by three packet ships to London informing the government of the defeat at Bladensburg; the fate of Cockburn and Ross; his order recalling the Potomac flotilla from its attack on Alexandria; and most importantly, his decision not to attack Baltimore with his depleted forces. The admiral also recommended reconsidering the planned attack on New Orleans that would require a new Army commander and substantial reinforcements.

His report was quickly followed by Governor Prevost’s news of the British defeat on Lake Champlain and the unsuccessful attack on Plattsburg, New York in mid-September. These reversals in North America coincided with increased troubles on the continent, prompting the Duke of Wellington to advise the government to make peace with the Americans. Lord Castlereagh ordered the British delegation at Ghent to drop London’s harsh terms to retain occupied portions of the United States as well as New Orleans, establish an Indian buffer state along the Ohio River, secure navigation rights on the Mississippi, and maintain and enforce the Orders in Council restricting US trade with Europe. The Treaty of Ghent that ended the war and restored the status quo ante bellum, was expeditiously signed on November 1, 1814, and ratified on Christmas Eve by the US Congress, thus ending the War of 1812.

* * *

William Weber is the author of Neither Victor Nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Press, 2013).

1814: How Washington Was Saved (Part 1) by William Weber

This year marks the 200th anniversary of the British capture of Washington, DC.  In July 1814, President James Madison chose William Winder, nephew of Maryland Governor Levin Winder, to command the new Tenth Military District created for the defense of Washington and Baltimore.  Winder, captured at the Battle of Stoney Creek in 1813 and recently exchanged, lacked command and combat experience.  Secretary of War Armstrong refused to support Winder after his preferred candidate, Moses Porter, was rejected.  Winder’s dismal performance resulted in the British capture of Washington and the burning of the White House and the Capitol. This alternate history explores what might have happened had Madison chosen Porter.

* * *

 
Brigadier General Moses Porter looked down on his handiwork with satisfaction and sadness. From atop Lowdnes Hill, he saw the red-jacketed bodies of countless British soldiers on the slope below and in the streets of the small village of Bladensburg. The surviving invaders were retreating in good order toward the town of Benedict on the Patuxent River where they had landed just a few days ago. Only scattered elements of the British rearguard could still be seen, covering the retreat of General Robert Ross’s army.

Porter saw few American dead from the patchwork of soldiers, sailors, and militiamen that had defended the hill and town. He suspected more were inside the trenches and brick structures that he had used to create a miniature fortress to stop the British advance on Washington. He expected his brigade commanders would provide him with a preliminary casualty lists before sunset. Some of them were eager to pursue the British. But it was late in the afternoon on 24 August 1814, and Porter was content to send out patrols to keep watch over the enemy as they retreated to their flotilla and moved down river to the Chesapeake Bay.

Frankly, Porter was more surprised than pleased by his victory. Only two months ago President James Madison had given him commend of the newly created Tenth Military District encompassing both Baltimore and Washington. Secretary of War John Armstrong, like Porter a veteran of the Revolutionary War, had advocated his appointment. The new district was being carved out of the Fifth Military District headquartered in Norfolk that Porter had taken command of that spring.

Armstrong argued that experience was the most important qualification for command, and Porter had plenty. He had fought in numerous battles in the Revolutionary War, survived St. Clair’s disaster in 1791, and accompanied “Mad” Anthony Wayne to Fallen Timbers three years later. In the current war, Porter had seen action in New York and Upper Canada, and gained considerable experience building defenses in New Orleans, New England, and Norfolk. Porter’s frequent use of profanity, which had earned him the nickname “Old Blow Hard,” was also an asset the Secretary of War admired especially in this case given the squabbling over who should defend the city. He was the perfect man for the job.

Porter immediately reached out to the prominent political and military officials in the area on whom he would depend for manpower, largely militia, and materiel. He met with Maryland’s Federalist Governor Levin Winder in Annapolis and Senator Samuel Smith, the ersatz warlord of Baltimore. The governor, who had lost his son, Colonel William Winder, at the battle of Stoney Creek in Upper Canada a year ago, was eager to help. Smith was also willing to cooperate as long as Porter did not meddle with his defenses around Baltimore.

At the federal level, Porter consulted with Secretary of the Navy William Jones, and Commodore Joshua Barney, who commanded the Chesapeake Bay Flotilla of gunboats. Porter also showed deference to the commanding officer of the District of Columbia’s militia, Major General John P. Van Ness, convincing Armstrong to pay for the activation of one of the city’s two brigades.

As an engineer and artillery officer, Porter’s concept of operations was grounded in geography. To defend Washington and Baltimore with a small contingent of regular forces and thousands of local militiamen, he needed to station a sizeable reserve force between those two cities that he could deploy in response to a British attack. He assumed that Admiral Cockburn, whose ships and troops had raided towns up and down the Bay, would use the waterways to get as close as possible for the nation’s capital. That favored the Patuxent River. The Potomac River featured both the dangerous Kettle Bottom shoals and Fort Washington that could engage ships attempting to ascend the river.

Relying on Van Ness’s counsel, Porter seized on the village of Bladensburg with its 1,500 souls as the location for his strategic reserve. The small town sat astride the National Road with a bridge crossing the eastern branch of the Potomac River that was also fordable at that point. Downstream, two other bridges led to Washington that he would order burned if the British advanced toward them. Composed of brick dwellings next to a prominent rise, Lowdnes Hill, Bladensburg was well situated and suited to being fortified as a garrison. Van Ness’s troops dug trenches and artillery positions on the hill and around the village. They also cleared trees and brush from the facing slopes of nearby hills to deprive British troops of cover. Porter named the strong point Fort Winder in honor of the governor’s son.

He convinced Barney that some of the guns from his flotilla, now trapped up the Patuxent River, were more likely to see action at Fort Winder. Barney agreed and had his officers and seamen move the flotilla’s armaments to the fort.

Porter also knew that a good defense needed a modicum of offensive capability to harass the British forces. He designated three regiments to train in that capacity: Colonel George Magruder’s 1st District Regiment from Washington, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Sterett’s 5th Regiment of Baltimore Volunteers, and Colonel George Minor’s regiment from Northern Virginia. All three fell in at Fort Winder to ensure that they were properly equipped, provisioned, and drilled, while becoming familiar with the local terrain. They identified numerous points on the roads where advancing British troops could be harassed and ambushed. In the hot and humid August weather, the British carrying heavy packs would be wearied and annoyed at the constant sniping Porter had planned for them.

Porter also improved Fort Washington guarding the approach up the Potomac, and convinced Virginia Governor James Barbour to help fortify the waterfront in Alexandria. Although part of the federal district, Alexandria’s defense was inseparable from the surrounding counties in Virginia. To sweeten the deal, Porter again relied on Armstrong’s patronage to deliver the necessary materials and funding, and he convinced Secretary Jones to shift some of his officers, seamen, and guns to bolster the defense of the Potomac.

It was not until mid-August that everything and everyone was in place and ready to execute Porter’s strategy. And that proved to be perfect timing. On August 16 a British flotilla commanded by Admiral Alexander Cochrane moved up the Patuxent and three days later landed a force of some 4,500 soldiers and sailors at Benedict. The leaders of the expedition, Major General Robert Ross and Admiral Cockburn, gave them a day to recover from the long sea voyage before setting out after Barney’s fleet.

Ross arranged his forces into three brigades. Colonel William Thornton commanded a Light Brigade, including the Eighty-Fifth Light Brigade; the light companies of his other regiments, and the Colonial Marines—freed slaves who volunteered to serve the Crown—at the head of his column. The Second Brigade, under Colonel Arthur Brooke, included the Fourth and Forty-Fourth infantry regiments. The Third Brigade led by Lieutenant Colonel William Patterson consisted of a battalion of Fusiliers and a battalion of Royal Marines. Ross’s force also included small numbers of artillerymen, engineers, and teamsters, as well as 100 sailors.  

On the morning of the August 20, the British marched out of Benedict on the road to Nottingham, with Cockburn commanding a flotilla of boats moving upriver on their right flank. Porter gave Sterret’s troops the honor of drawing first blood. A company of the Fifth Regiment fired three volleys at the column’s rear guard and then marched to their next position. The direction and the brevity of the attack surprised the British, whose flankers had not detected the enemy.

As the British stopped for rest at mid-morning, another company of the Fifth directed several volleys at the light infantry guarding their left flank before disappearing into the surrounding forest. They repeated this harassment late in the afternoon when Sterett’s men sent several musket volleys toward the advance guard, while a company of Minor’s Virginians began sniping at the British flotilla from the northern bank of the Patuxent. Sterett gave the British one more scare just after sunset, prompting Ross to muster his troops to fend off an attack that never came.

These iterative attacks continued over the next two days with a third company from Magruder’s District regiment taking part. When Cockburn and Ross reached Pig’s Point on the morning of August 22, Barney’s sailors scuttled their vessels in a series of deafening explosions. Simultaneously, Minor’s company opened up from the northern side of the river while Marguder’s militiamen fired several volleys before conducting an orderly withdrawal. The British, in keeping with Cockburn’s longstanding policy in the Bay, responded by burning and plundering every town and homestead they encountered.

This skirmishing put the British in a particularly foul mood by the time they reached the nearly deserted town of Upper Marlboro that afternoon. When the British light infantry vanguard quickly searched and secured the town before the main force entered, found several wounded American soldiers in the home of Dr. William Beanes, the town’s most prominent citizen. They dragged the wounded from his house and placed him under arrest. When Ross and Cockburn arrived, Beanes’ quickly offered to let the British officers use his home as their headquarters, in return for the safety of his town and the American wounded. His Scottish accent and Federalist political views persuaded them to graciously accept his hospitality. Nevertheless, several of the American prisoners died that evening, almost certainly from their wounds, but word spread to the American forces that some had been executed.
        
That evening, Ross and Cockburn received a message from the British fleet commander, Admiral Cochrane, advising them to return to Benedict. Having achieved their initial objective, he cautioned them against taking further risks by marching inland. He wanted them to return to the fleet for an attack on Baltimore. Cockburn had little trouble persuading Ross to press on to Washington. The general was infuriated by the sniping that had inflicted some three dozen casualties on his troops and, by delaying his advance, had contributed to more cases of heat exhaustion and fatigue. He wanted to defeat the Americans in battle, expecting they would be forced to stand and fight once his expedition neared Washington. That opportunity soon presented itself.

Check Out Part 2...

* * *

William Weber is the author of Neither Victor Nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Press, 2013).

Does the Sun Set on the British Empire?

Guest post by William Weber.

My previous guest post, Rethinking the War of 1812, highlighted the use of structured scenarios and less plausible outcomes in exploring counterfactual histories of our “strangest war.”  In reading Charles Emmerson’s 1913: In Search of the World Before the Great War, a tour d’horzion of many of the world’s metropolises 100 years ago, I was surprised to find a similar discussion of the future of the British Empire (p. 435-6).

Emmerson first notes that Richard Jebb’s The Britannic Question, published in 1913, presented two structured pairs of possible outcomes.  The first outcome, the fading ‘Colonial Dependence’ and a future ‘Britannic Alliance’—his preferred option—of self-governing ‘Britannic’ states, focused on the question of sovereignty.  Jebb’s second pair consisted of two versions of ‘Imperial Federation,’ one without and one with racial equality.  In the latter, India enjoys a stature equal to that of Australia and Canada. Jebb wrote that which path would occur—perhaps a combination, perhaps none—remained to be seen.  Collectively, these scenarios paint optimistic futures where the “Sun Never Sets” on the British Empire.

Emmerson then writes that other authors at the beginning of the 20th century presented more dire, but ad hoc scenarios.  He cites a 1905 pamphlet, entitled The Decline and the Fall of the British Empire, purporting to be published in Tokyo a hundred years in the future, in 2005.  In this future world, Russia rules India, and Germany governs South Africa.  Egypt has gained its independence, Canada has joined the United States, and Australia is a Japanese protectorate. In this pamphlet, supposedly published for the edification of Japanese imperial strategists, the Britain of the future is an empire in decline, and perhaps finally extinguished.  “As Babylon and Assyria have left us their monuments, Egypt her pyramids, Carthage her Queen, and Rome her laws, so too England has bequeathed to posterity Shakespeare and her world-wide language. The history of the British Empire has become a lesson for mankind, the story of her fall a reminder to living Empires of those ‘subtle influences’ which are ever present, that quicken the germs of national decay, and transfer the sovereignty of the earth.”

These “subtle influences” included: the rise of the city over the countryside, the loss of Britons’ maritime skills, the growth of refinement and luxury, the absence of literary taste, the decline of the physical form of Britons, the decay of the country’s religious life, excessive taxation, false systems of education and, finally, the inability of the British to defend the empire.  All of these problems existed in 1905, and it only took a small effort of imagination to extrapolate forward a century to conclude that Britain’s empire was not guaranteed to last forever.  Such pessimistic projections judged that the seeds of its fall had been planted and, to mix metaphors, perhaps the rot was beginning to set in. Hence, these scenarios present the opposite outcome where the “Sun Inevitably Sets” on the British Empire.

A century later, Jebb and his contemporaries have left a rich treasure trove of counterfactual histories to explore and develop.  Their alternative futures at the beginning of the last century could be used as counterfactual histories of the last 100 years. Those interested in imaging and extrapolating from these works might want to consult two newer, but equally sweeping volumes: John Darwin’s After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400-2000, and Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper’s Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference.  Both explain how empires worked and why they persisted in a variety of geographic and cultural contexts.  Rich stuff for fashioning counterfactual tales.  

* * *

Bill Weber is the author of Neither Victor nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Books, 2013).

Rethinking the War of 1812

Guest post by Bill Weber.

The bicentennial of the War of 1812 provides an excellent opportunity to use alternative history to recognize the importance of a conflict that historians have labeled as both “the strangest war in our national history” and a “forgotten conflict.”  At the most basic level, Henry Adams' “had only X done Y” approach to alternative history in his classic study of the war identifies tactical and operational decisions that could have changed the outcomes of numerous battles and campaigns. He generally reserved this formulation for analyzing the performances of American and British senior officers whose performance he found wanting, often noting how their more competent opponents could have further exploited the situation. For example, Adams wrote extensively on General William Hull’s star-crossed invasion of Canada and his eventual surrender of his entire army to Maj. Gen. Isaac Brock in Detroit.  He identified a number of alternative outcomes, strongly indicating that Hull’s debacle, while tragic, was eminently avoidable.

Such events and turning points can be woven into broader scenarios based on key factors or variables that could have altered history on a broader scale.  One such factor is that the War of 1812 was very much a product of the Napoleonic wars in Europe that could have ended sooner or later than 1815.  Meanwhile, the talents of individual generals heavily shaped military operations on both sides of the Atlantic. J. P. Riley’s study of the Napoleonic wars notes, “At the end of the day, the personal qualities of the allied field commander may well be the major factor in determining the success or failure of a coalition force at an operational level.”  Juxtaposing these two factors, we can imagine a brief War of 1812 that truly was “a mere matter of marching” for the United States in conquering Canada, as well as prolonged conflict where after several years Wellington’s Invincibles strip away the Louisiana Purchase and some territories London ceded to the Americans in 1783.

Finally, alternative history also calls for looking at less plausible outcomes.  What if, London and Washington avoided going to War in 1812 by pursuing British overtures after the assassination of Spencer Perceval or even earlier by ratifying the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty of 1806?  What would the United States look like had the war been avoided and Andrew Jackson not risen to prominence?  Conversely, what if the War of 1812 had led to a direr predicament for the United States by triggering the worst aspects of democracy and military dictatorship feared by the classically minded Founding Fathers?

Of course, the utility of such excursions is not to “prove” that any or all of these alternative histories could have occurred.  As David Hackett Fischer noted: “There is nothing necessarily fallacious in fictional constructs, as long as they are properly recognized for what they are and are clearly distinguished from empirical problems . . . Fictional questions can also be heuristically useful to historians, somewhat in the manner of metaphors and analogies, for the ideas and inferences which they help to suggest.”  In this sense, alternative history can help us better appreciate what happened in the War of 1812 and why, as well as appreciate the implications that conflict had for the future of North America.

Moreover, alternative histories can help us think beyond the two established narratives of the War of 1812.  The first is Mr. Madison’s War, a tale of military ineptitude.  The second is The Second War for Independence, a sequel to 1776 featuring Andrew Jackson as a second George Washington.  Subjecting these narratives to the “stress tests” of alternative (and comparative) histories would help us better understand this war following its bicentennial.

* * *

                 
Bill Weber is the author of Neither Victor nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Books, 2013).